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### Advisory Opinion

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December 21, 2007  
Thomas J. Donohue  
President and CEO  
U.S. Chamber of Commerce  
1615 H Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20062-2000

2007-07A  
ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)  
29 CFR 2509.94-2

Dear Mr. Donohue:

This is in response to your recent letter in which you express concern about the use of pension plan fiduciaries to further public policy debates and political activities through proxy resolutions that have to enhancing the value of the plan's investment in a company. In view of the significance of the is raised, we are responding to your letter in the form of an advisory opinion that further clarifies the Interpretive Bulletin 94-2 (29 CFR § 2509.94-2).

By way of background, section 404(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA, or the Act) require that plan fiduciaries act prudently, solely in the interest of the plan's participants and beneficiaries, and for the exclusive purpose of paying benefits and defraying reasonable administrative expenses. Interpretive Bulletin 94-2 specifically addresses the application of section 404(a)(1), as well as section 404(a)(2) of ERISA, to proxy voting and shareholder-related activities. In that Bulletin, the Department, among other things, set forth its view that the fiduciary duties described in section 404(a)(1)(A) and (B) generally require that the responsible fiduciary must only consider those factors that affect the value of the plan's investment. In addition, the responsible fiduciary may not subordinate the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income objectives.

The Bulletin provides that the fiduciary obligations of prudence and loyalty require responsible fiduciaries to take into account the costs involved when deciding whether to exercise their shareholder rights. These costs include, but are not limited to, expenditures related to developing proxy resolutions, proxy voting and the analysis of the likely net effect of a particular issue on the value of the plan's investment. The Bulletin also provides that fiduciaries must take all of these factors into account in determining whether the exercise of such rights (including the voting of a proxy), independently or in conjunction with other shareholders, is expected to have a net benefit to the value of the plan's investment that will outweigh the cost of exercising such rights. This same principle applies to fiduciary activities that involve monitoring or influencing the management of a corporation. In addition, the Bulletin provides that an investment policy that contemplates activities intended to monitor or influence the management of a corporation in which a plan owns shares is consistent with a fiduciary's obligation to act in the best interests of the plan's participants and beneficiaries only where the responsible fiduciary concludes that there is a reasonable expectation that such activities, alone or in conjunction with other shareholders, is likely to result in an enhancement of the value of the plan's investment in the corporation sufficient to outweigh the costs involved.

The Department has previously expressed strong concern about the use of plan assets to promote legislative, regulatory or public policy positions that have no connection to the payment of benefits or the defraying of administrative expenses.<sup>(1)</sup> In this regard, the Department indicated that the mere fact that plans are an important part of the national economy, and are generally affected by legislation, regulations, actions a

affect the economy as a whole, does not convert legislative, regulatory or policy proposals concerning into a rationale for spending plan assets on the policy debate. The Department rejects a construction would render the Act's tight limits on the use of plan assets illusory, and that would permit plan fiduciaries to use ERISA trust assets to promote myriad public policy preferences, and believes that these principles apply with force to a plan fiduciary's support or pursuit of a proxy proposal.

Under section 404(a)(1)(A) and (B) of ERISA, plan fiduciaries must act solely in the interest of plan beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of paying benefits and defraying reasonable administrative expenses. In our view, plan fiduciaries risk violating the exclusive purpose rule when they exercise their fiduciary duty to attempt to further legislative, regulatory or public policy issues through the proxy process when the action is not in the economic benefit to the plan. In such cases, the Department would expect fiduciaries to be able to take appropriate enforcement actions to ensure their compliance with the requirements of section 404(a)(1)(A) and (B).

The mere fact that plans are shareholders in the corporations in which they invest does not itself provide a reasonable expectation that doing so will enhance the value of the plan's investment. To the contrary, Department Bulletin 94-2 makes it clear that plan fiduciaries, when considering whether to support or oppose a proxy proposal to engage in activities intended to monitor or influence the management of corporations, must first take into account the cost of such action and the role of the investment in the plan's portfolio, and cannot act unless the action is reasonably likely to enhance the value of the plan's investment and will not sacrifice the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries to unrelated objectives. As the Department has indicated in other contexts, plan fiduciaries may not increase expenses, sacrifice investment returns, or reduce the size of plan benefits to support or promote goals not directly related to the plan.

Consistent with these various pronouncements, the use of pension plan assets by plan fiduciaries to fund political issues through proxy resolutions that have no connection to enhancing the value of the plan's investment in a corporation would, in the view of the Department, violate the prudence and exclusive purpose requirements of section 404(a)(1)(A) and (B). For example, the likelihood that the adoption of a proxy resolution requiring corporate directors and officers to disclose their personal political contributions would enhance the value of a plan's investment in the corporation appears sufficiently remote that the expenditure of plan assets to fund such a resolution or proposal clearly raises compliance issues under section 404(a)(1)(A) and (B).

This letter constitutes an advisory opinion under ERISA Procedure 76-1. Accordingly, it is issued under the provisions of that procedure, including section 10 thereof relating to the effect of advisory opinions.

Sincerely,  
Robert J. Doyle  
Director of Regulations and Interpretations

[Attachment](#)

## Footnotes

1. See letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Program Operations, Employment Security Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, to Jonathan P. Hiatt, General Counsel, dated March 3, 2005 ([copy attached](#)).

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